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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS-
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES-The United
States Supreme Court has held that the sentencing authority in
capital punishment cases may not refuse as a matter of law to con-
sider evidence offered in mitigation of the sentence of death.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
On April 4, 1977, Monty Lee Eddings, then sixteen years old, ran
away from his home in Camdenton, Missouri, taking his brother's
automobile and three of his father's rifles.' Eddings was accompa-
nied by three other runaways.' After driving aimlessly, they
reached the Tulsa gate of the Oklahoma turnpike where the group
picked up a hitchhiker.3 While attempting to light a cigarette, Ed-
dings temporarily lost control of the car and was signaled to pull
off the road by Patrolman Larry Crabtree of the Oklahoma High-
way Patrol." When Patrolman Crabtree, who was approaching the
car, was about six feet away, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out
the window and fired, killing him.5
The trial judge, finding merit in the State's argument that Ed-
dings was not likely to be rehabilitated within the juvenile system,
granted the State's motion to have him certified to stand trial as
an adult.6 The ruling was affirmed on appeal 7 whereupon Eddings
was charged with murder in the first degree and found guilty upon
his plea of nolo contendere8 In accordance with the Oklahoma
death penalty statute,9 the court conducted a separate sentencing
1. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 871-72 (1982). See Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d
1159, 1162 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
2. 616 P.2d at 1162. With Eddings were his sister and two friends. Id.
3. Id.
4. 102 S. Ct. at 872.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 921
(1978).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 872. A plea of nolo contendere has the same legal effect as a plea of
guilty. See Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926).
9. The Oklahoma death penalty statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West
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hearing to determine if the sentence to be imposed would be death
or life imprisonment.10
In order to sentence a defendant to death under the Oklahoma
statute, the finder of fact must find that at least one aggravating
circumstance 1 was present and was not outweighed by the finding
of one or more mitigating circumstances. 12 The State, arguing for
the death penalty for Eddings, alleged three aggravating circum-
stances: "that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel; that it was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest; and that there existed a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society."' 3
In an attempt to prove the existence of mitigating circum-
stances, Eddings presented the testimony of his supervising juve-
nile officer as evidence of his troubled youth.14 Other testimony
Supp. 1981-1982), provides in pertinent part:
Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first degree, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . .In the sentencing proceeding,
evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act.
Id.
10. 102 S. Ct. at 872.
11. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West Supp. 1981-1982), defines aggravating
circumstances as follows:
1. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person;
2. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person;
3. The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remunera-
tion or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration;
4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
5. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or prosecution;
6. The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment
or conviction of a felony;
7. The existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society or;
8. The victim of the murder was a peace officer as defined by Section 99 of Title 21 of
the Oklahoma Statutes, or guard of an institution under the Department of Correc-
tions, and such person was killed while in performance of official duty.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
12. See 102 S. Ct. at 872. See supra note 9. The statute does not define what is meant
by a mitigating circumstance, but provides that "[in the sentencing proceeding, evidence
may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circum-
stances enumerated in this act." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
13. 102 S. Ct. at 872. See supra note 11.
14. 102 S. Ct. at 872. The juvenile officer testified that Eddings' parents were divorced
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was presented which indicated that Eddings was emotionally dis-
turbed, had a sociopathic or anti-social personality, and could be
rehabilitated by intensive therapy over a fifteen to twenty year
period."6
The trial judge, at the close of all the evidence, held that the
State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the three alleged ag-
gravating circumstances."' Eddings' youth was found to be an im-
portant mitigating circumstance, but not one which alone would
outweigh the aggravating factors. The trial judge refused to con-
sider Eddings' insecure childhood and emotional disturbance as a
mitigating factor. Accordingly, the sentence of death was
imposed.
17
As required by statute, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
reviewed the sentence." The court agreed with the State that each
of the aggravating circumstances existed, and after considering the
mitigating factors in depth, endorsed the trial court's decision that
the only proper mitigating factor to be considered was Eddings'
youth.19
Eddings sought review by the United States Supreme Court. Af-
ter granting certiorari, 0 the Court reversed and held that the
death sentence was imposed without an individualized considera-
tion of mitigating- factors as required by the eighth and fourteenth
when he was five years old; that his mother may have been an alcoholic and possibly a
prostitute; that when he was 14 years old, Eddings was sent to live with his father as his
mother could no longer control him; and that attempts to reason continually gave way to
physical punishment which made Eddings frightened and bitter. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 873.
17. Id. The trial judge, in a statement issued from the bench, indicated that in his
opinion, it was appropriate to consider Eddings' youth as a mitigating circumstance but that
he was not permitted as a matter of law to consider Eddings' upbringing and emotional
disturbances. He stated, "[tihe Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the ... fact that the
youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime was committed. Nor can the Court in
following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent back-
ground." Id. (quoting Appellate Record at 189) (emphasis added by the court).
18. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 869
(1982). OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13 (West Supp. 1981-1982) requires that "[wihenever
the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the
sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals." Id.
19. 102 S. Ct. at 873-74.
20. 453 U.S. 950 (1981). The Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari to decide
only the question of whether the infliction of the death penalty on a child who was sixteen
at the time of the crime was cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII and XIV. See
infra text accompanying note 25.
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amendments in capital punishment cases.2 1
Justice Powell, writing for the majority,2 noted that in Lockett
v. Ohio,23 the Court had held that the sentencer in a capital case
must be given the opportunity to consider any and all aspects of a
defendant's character as a mitigating factor.2 4 Justice Powell dis-
cussed the history of the development of standards to be utilized
when capital punishment is to be imposed. He noted that the legal
system had struggled to develop a system of capital punishment
with two objectives in mind: that the system be consistent and
principled while taking into account the uniqueness of the individ-
ual and the crime.2 5 Justice Powell noted that at common law, all
criminal homicides were treated as capital offenses and carried a
mandatory death sentence. The law then evolved to allow excep-
tions, including an exclusion provided for those entitled to claim
the benefit of clergy.26 Eventually, capital punishment was limited
only to deliberate or predetermined murders.2 7 Justice Powell ex-
plained that the American legal system first attempted to relieve
the steadfastness of the common law of England by graduating
murder into degrees and defining as a capital offense only murder
in the first degree. The imposition of the death penalty was then
committed to the absolute discretion of the jury.2 Justice Powell
noted that the rule announced in Lockett was arrived at after the
Court had reflected on the history of the law surrounding capital
21. 102 S. Ct. at 871. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
22. Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens.
Justices Brennan and O'Connor joined in the Court's opinion and also filed separate concur-
ring opinions. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices
White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
23. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
24. Id. at 604. Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly present the Lockett
issue, but it was argued in his brief for the Court, and the State of Oklahoma responded. As
the Court decided the case on the basis of Lockett, the question of whether the eighth
amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the murder was
not addressed. 102 S. Ct. at 874 n.5. See infra text accompanying notes 107-09.
25. 102 S. Ct. at 874.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Justice Powell stated that by the time Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
was decided, the United States had moved so far from a mandatory means of imposing the
death penalty that the decision of whether one should be sentenced to death had become




Justice Powell then cited Furman v. Georgia0 as the beginning
of the Court's attempts to provide for imposition of the death pen-
alty on the basis of consistency and fairness and away from the
arbitrary and capricious system of the past.81 He noted that in
Gregg v. Georgia,82 the Georgia death penalty statute at issue di-
rected the jury's attention to the characteristics of the person who
committed the crime, and therefore was constitutional.8" The stat-
ute required the jury to find at least one aggravating circumstance
as enumerated in the statute and to consider any mitigating cir-
cumstances.8' Justice Powell also observed that in Woodson v.
North Carolina,8" the Court had held that mandatory capital pun-
ishment was not an acceptable substitute where juries had imposed
the death penalty in an arbitrary manner. 86 The eighth amend-
ment requires that consideration be given to the character and re-
cord of the individual.87 Concluding that the rule in Lockett fol-
lowed the earlier decisions of the Court, Justice Powell then stated
that capital punishment must be imposed in a fair and consistent
manner or not at all.88 He maintained that the sentencer in capital
cases must consider any relevant mitigating factors, for to ignore
individual differences is not at all a consistent manner in which to
impose the death penalty.89
Applying the Lockett rule to the Eddings case, Justice Powell
29. 102 S. Ct. at 874.
30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
31. 102 S. Ct. at 874.
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
33. 102 S. Ct. at 874. The Court in Gregg held that the danger of an arbitrary and
capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance." Gregg 428 U.S. at 195.
34. 102 S. Ct. at 874 n.6. "[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of
the person who committed the crime .... Are there any special facts about this defendant
that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his youth, the extent of his coopera-
tion with the police, his emotional state at the time of the crime)." Id. (quoting Gregg, 428
U.S. at 197).
35. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
36. 102 S. Ct. at 874-75.
37. Id. at 875. "[Tlhe fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Id. (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at
304). See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (death penalty statute which makes
capital punishment mandatory for a conviction of first degree murder held
unconstitutional).




held that the trial judge had not found the evidence presented in
mitigation inadequate to offset the aggravating circumstances as a
matter of fact. Rather, he found that the trial judge had not even
considered the evidence offered in mitigation because he believed
that, as a matter of law, he was not permitted to consider Eddings'
violent background.40
Justice Powell also concluded that the Oklahoma Court of Crim-
inal Appeals had not considered all evidence presented by Ed-
dings, but had only considered as mitigating that evidence which
might relieve Eddings of criminal liability."1 While acknowledging
that Eddings had a personality disorder, the Court-of Criminal Ap-
peals concluded that he knew the difference between right and
wrong and thus met the test of criminal responsibility.
42
Justice Powell held that the refusal of the Oklahoma courts to
consider the evidence offered in mitigation was a violation of Lock-
ett.4' He found the refusal of the trial judge to consider the evi-
dence as a matter of law the same as, if the trial judge had in-
structed a jury to disregard the evidence offered in mitigation, 4
and stated that considering the fact that Eddings was sixteen years
old when the crime was committed, the evidence offered in mitiga-
tion was especially relevant. 45 However, Justice Powell observed
that while the trial judge had recognized youth as a valid mitigat-
ing factor, he had failed to realize that youth is a time when one
may be easily influenced and is generally less mature and responsi-
ble than an adult.'6
Justice Powell maintained that in addition to a consideration of
age as a relevant mitigating factor, the sentencer must consider the
40. Id. The violent background referred to was Eddings' family background. Id.
41. Id. See Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd, 102
S. Ct. 869 (1982).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 875. Eddings argued to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that
the imposition of the death penalty in his case was excessive punishment under the eighth
amendment in view of the mitigating factors present. The court rejected this claim, holding
that Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances that
deserved weight in the decision-making process. Id. at 875-76 n.9.
43. Id. at 875.
44. 102 S. Ct. at 875-76. Justice Powell noted that the Oklahoma death penalty statute
permits the presentation of any mitigating circumstances, while Lockett requires the sen-
tencer to listen. Id. at 876 n.10.
45. Id. at 876. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), for an example of a
case where evidence of difficult family history and of emotional disturbance was introduced
by a defendant in mitigation. Id. at 187-88.
46. 102 S. Ct. at 876. "Particularly during the formative years of childhood and adoles-
cence, minors often lack the experience, perspective and judgment expected of adults." Id.
at 877 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
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background and mental and emotional development of a youthful
defendant. 47 In the present case, this included Eddings' violent and
neglectful family background and the testimony presented which
indicated that Eddings' mental and emotional development was
below his age level. 48 Because he believed that the Oklahoma
Courts had improperly limited the scope of their inquiry by disre-
garding such evidence, Justice Powell remanded the case and or-
dered that all relevant mitigating evidence offered by Eddings be
considered and weighed against the evidence of aggravating
circumstances.4 '9
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's opinion. However, he
reiterated his previously expressed view that in all circumstances,
capital punishment is violative of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
50
Justice O'Connor also filed a concurring opinion,5 in which she
justified the Court's consideration of the Lockett issue despite the
fact that it had not been presented to the court below.52 She reiter-
ated the importance of a procedure free of prejudice or mistake
when the death penalty is to be imposed," and stressed that the
sentencer is not to be precluded, except in the rarest instance,
from considering any relevant evidence which a defendant offers to
escape the death penalty. 4 She disagreed with the dissent's sug-
gestion that a remand would serve no useful purpose," concluding
that it was entirely proper and indeed was the duty. of the Court to
insure that any mitigating information not considered by the trial
judge be considered on remand. 56
47. 102 S. Ct. at 877.
48. Id. Justice Powell cautioned, however, that the Court was not suggesting an ab-
sence of legal responsibility for the criminal acts of a minor, explaining that the concern of
the Court was with the manner in which the death penalty is imposed. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 877 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's belief that the death pen-
alty is a form of cruel and unusual punishment was expressed previously in Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 877 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 877 & n.13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976) which
authorizes the Supreme Court to require such further proceedings to be had "as may be just
under the circumstances." Id.
53. 102 S. Ct. at 878 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
55. 102 S. Ct. at 878 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
In any event, we may not speculate as to whether the trial judge and the Court of
Criminal Appeals actually considered all of the mitigating factors and found them
insufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances, or whether the difference between
1983
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Referring to Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor conceded that the Court's opinion was indicative that
some Justices would not have imposed the death penalty had they
been the trial judge. She did not, however, view the opinion as al-
tering the constitutionality of the death penalty or as deciding
whether it may be imposed upon an individual who committed a
murder at age sixteen. On the contrary, Justice O'Connor read the
Court's opinion simply as placing emphasis on some of the various
forms of mitigating evidence which the trial court might not have
considered. 7
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger" asserted that the
majority had gone beyond the narrow question on which certiorari
had been granted and had decided the case on an issue not raised
in the courts below.59 He noted that the Ohio death penalty statute
found unconstitutional in Lockett v. Ohio" did not permit individ-
ualized consideration of mitigating evidence; however, the Lockett
decision also did not undertake to ascribe the weight to be ac-
corded these mitigating factors by the sentencing court. 1
The Chief Justice observed that the Oklahoma death penalty
statute62 contained provisions very similar to those cited with ap-
proval in Lockett." Yet, in Chief Justice Burger's view, the Court
had ignored the fact that, in line with the Oklahoma statute, the
trial court had permitted Eddings to present substantial evidence
this Court's opinion and the trial court's treatment of the petitioner's evidence is
'purely a matter of semantics,' as suggested by the dissent.
Id.
57. Id. at 878-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. 102 S. Ct. at 879 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger was joined by
Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
59. Id. Chief Justice Burger noted that the only question upon which certiorari was
granted was whether the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty on a defendant who was 16 years old at the time of the crime. Id. See supra
note 48.
60. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
61. 102 S. Ct. at 879-80 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also pointed
out that Lockett did not in any way suggest that the Supreme Court may substitute its
sentencing judgment for that of state courts. Id. at 880 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
62. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 701.10-.11 (West Supp. 1981-1982). Section 701.11 pro-
vides that "unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in
this act is [found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt] or if it is found that any such aggra-
vating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances,
the death penalty shall not be imposed." Id. § 701.11. See supra note 9.
Chief Justice Burger explained that this provision instructs the sentencer to weigh the
mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant against the aggravating circumstances
proven by the State. 102 S. Ct. at 880 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
63. 102 S. Ct. at 880 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
522 Vol. 21:515
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of his troubled youth at the sentencing hearing, and had spent a
considerable amount of time listening to testimony concerning Ed-
dings' personality and family history. Instead, the majority, in an
attempt to make out a violation of Lockett, had focused on a single
sentence of the trial judge's oral opinion in which he stated that he
could not consider Eddings' background as a mitigating circum-
stance.64 Chief Justice Burger argued that this informally delivered
statement could not be read as expressing anything more than the
trial court's finding that the aggravating circumstances were not
outweighed by the evidence presented in mitigation," and stressed
that certainly, the Lockett decision would not preclude the trial
court from making such a determination."
The Chief Justice also disputed the finding of the Court that the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had considered as mitigating
only that evidence which would excuse Eddings from criminal lia-
bility.6 7 The Chief Justice interpreted the court of criminal ap-
peals' holding as stating nothing more than a conclusion that the
evidence offered in mitigation was not sufficient to offset the aggra-
vating circumstances. 68 In the opinion of Chief Justice Burger, the
mere fact that the court of criminal appeals had required several
paragraphs to summarize the evidence presented was indicative of
the relevancy of the evidence. Furthermore, the Chief Justice did
not think that the majority had sufficiently explained its assump-
tion that the court of criminal appeals believed it was unable, as a
matter of law, to consider Eddings' background. 9
The Chief Justice noted that when discussing the evidence of-
fered by Eddings, neither the trial court nor the court of criminal
appeals had labeled the evidence as mitigating factors.7 0 He was
not of the opinion that all evidence offered in mitigation must be
described as such; rather, only that evidence which rises to a level
of persuasiveness sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance
64. Id. at 881 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The sentence of the trial court judge of which
Chief Justice Burger was speaking was delivered extemporaneously from the bench. See
supra note 17.
65. 102 S. Ct. at 881 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The court of criminal appeals, after reviewing
the testimony concerning Eddings' personality and family background stated that while Ed-
dings' "family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the way he did ... it does not
excuse his behavior." Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd,
102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).





must be so described. Chief Justice Burger maintained that in
contrast, the majority seemed to require that all evidence offered
in mitigation be described as a mitigating factor regardless of its
weight.7 2 The Chief Justice saw this requirement of the majority as
providing little support for the conclusion reached. In his opinion,
the Oklahoma courts had merely chosen to give little weight to the
evidence offered in mitigation when balancing it against the of-
fense committed, a result not inconsistent with Lockett.75
Chief Justice Burger conceded that it is a difficult task to decide
capital punishment cases, but questioned whether a remand would
serve any useful purpose. He noted that two Oklahoma courts had
found the evidence offered in mitigation insufficient to offset the
aggravating circumstances.7' While some members of the Court, in-
cluding Chief Justice Burger himself, might not have imposed the
death penalty, he argued that the Supreme Court does not have
the power to determine the appropriateness of state court
sentences, but only their constitutionality. 75 In conclusion, the
Chief Justice stated that since the sentencing proceedings were in
no way inconsistent with Lockett v. Ohio, he would have decided
the case on the sole issue upon which certiorari had been granted,
and affirm the judgment.
7
The 1972 Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia77 is con-
sidered to be the foundation of modern death penalty law. Prior to
Furman, the states permitted the sentencer broad discretion in the'
imposition of the death penalty on a case-by-case approach.78 In
Furman, a five justice majority7 ' reversed several death sentences
71. Id. The Chief Justice stated: 'It is plain to me, however, that this was purely a
matter of semantics associated with the rational belief that 'evidence in mitigation' must




74. Id. at 883 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. 102 S. Ct. at 883 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice noted that the ma-
jority opinion did not suggest that there was a constitutional ban against the imposition of
the death penalty on a person under 18 years of age when the crime was committed. Certio-
rari had been granted solely to address this question. Id. See supra note 20.
77. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
78. For example, in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court held that
providing a jury absolute discretion as to the imposition of the death penalty in capital
cases was constitutional. The Court noted that it would be beyond human knowledge to
establish definitive standards for the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 204.
79. The opinion was per curiam and the five Justices who formed the majority, Doug-
las, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall all filed separate concurring opinions. 408 U.S.
Vol. 21:515
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imposed under statutes of Georgia and Texas.80 The five separate
opinions authored by the Furman majority focused on the theme
that sentencing authorities exercising unbridled discretion in capi-
tal cases acted capriciously in selecting defendants for execution
and were prone to discrimination against minority defendants.81
The Furman majority did not, however, provide clear guidance to
-state legislatures wishing to draft a death penalty statute which
would pass constitutional muster.8 2 In response to Furman, two
types of death penalty statutes were drafted by the legislatures of
thirty-five states.8 One type of statute imposed a mandatory death
penalty for a limited category of specific crimes, thus eliminating
all discretion from the sentencing process, 4 while the second
vested discretion in the sentencer with standards to guide the
decision.88
Four years after Furman, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of both types of statutes. In 1976, the Court up-
held death penalty statutes enacted by Georgia,86 Florida, 7 and
Texas,88 all of which provided the sentencing judge or jury the dis-
cretion to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating cir-
cumstances on an individual case-by-case approach. In the same
term, the Court held unconstitutional the mandatory death pen-
alty statutes of North Carolina 9 and Louisiana, 90 because they did
not permit sentencer consideration of the individual mitigating cir-
cumstances as required by Furman.91
at 239.
80. Id.
81. See Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and
the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L.
RaV. 317, 319-20 (1981).
82. See Note, Furman to Gregg, The Judicial and Legislative History, 22 How. L.J.
53 (1979); Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes,
87 HARv. L. Rav. 1690, 1699-1712 (1974).
83. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 81, at 320.
84. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 599-600.
85. Id. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
86. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
87. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
88. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
89. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
90. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
91. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), Woodson v. North Carolina
the Court in highlighting a constitutional shortcoming of the North Carolina death penalty
statute noted its failure to permit individualized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and record of each convicted defendant before sentencing. Id. at 303.
1983 525
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In Gregg v. Georgia,"2 the Court upheld the Georgia death pen-
alty statute as constitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.93 Review of each sentence by the Georgia Supreme
Court, coupled with the requirement that the jury review specifi-
cally the character of the defendant and nature of the crime, was
held to be adequate to protect against the random or arbitrary im-
position of the death penalty.94 In the companion case of Woodson
v. North Carolina," the Court invalidated the North Carolina
mandatory death penalty statute because it did not permit sen-
tencer consideration of the character and record of the indiviudal
offender and the circumstances surrounding the particular crime."
The Court, in the 1976 death penalty cases, adopted the position
that the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment
violative of the eighth amendment, but only unconstitutional if im-
posed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.' 7 To assure that
the death penalty is imposed in a consistent and fair manner, capi-
tal defendants have a constitutional right to receive sentencer con-
sideration of mitigating circumstances. However, the Court did not
fully define the breadth and depth of this right, 8 nor did the
Court define what it considered to be a relevant mitigating fact in
capital sentencing cases or the degree of consideration to be ac-
corded these facts. 9
The constitutionality of the Ohio death penalty statute was ex-
amined by the Court in Lockett v. Ohio.10 0 In an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger,10 1 the Court held the statute unconstitutional be-
92. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
93. Id. at 206-07. The Court held that a statute which provides for the imposition of
the death penalty after sentencer consideration of statutory aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumtances in a bifurcated proceeding is constitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Id.
94. Id. See 19 DuQ. L. Rzv. 539, 548 (1981).
95. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
96. Id. See supra text accompanying note 85.
97. See supra note 94 at 550. See 19 DuQ. L. Rzv. 539, 550 (1981).
98. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 81, at 323.
99. The death penalty statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) were held constitu-
tional on their face. The Supreme Court did not address their constitutionality as applied
by the lower courts. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 81, at 322.
100. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
101. Id. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was in three parts. Part three dealt
with the analysis of the Ohio death penalty statute and was joined by Justices Stevens,
Powell, and Stewart. Id. at 597. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment but would have decided the case for different reasons. Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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cause it precluded the sentencer from considering aspects of the
defendant's character and any circumstances of the crime as miti-
gating factors, as required by the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.102 The Court noted that the death penalty is a unique form
of punishment and concluded, therefore, that it is essential that
decisions in a capital case be made on an individualized basis. 0 3
The Court stated that while no procedure for imposing the death
penalty would be perfect, the very least that is required is that the
sentencer be permitted to give independent weight to aspects of
the defendant's character and circumstances of the crime offered
in mitigation.1' 4
The procedural safeguards established in Furman05 to prevent
the random and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty were re-
fined in Gregg1 " and Lockett. However, while the Lockett Court
had held that the capital defendant has an absolute right to have
any aspect of character, record, or offense offered in mitigation
considered by the sentencing authority, 0 7 no guidance was given
concerning the weight to be accorded the offered evidence. 08
Eddings appears to be consistent with Lockett and a further re-
finement of the procedural safeguards required when the imposi-
tion of the death penalty is at issue. The holding of Lockett'0 9
would be of little practical value were the sentencer permitted as a
matter of law to fail or refuse to consider evidence offered in
mitigation." 0
Eddings does not specifically define what evidence constitutes a
mitigating factor. It does, however, require the sentencer to weigh
all evidence offered in mitigation. Due to the uniqueness and final-
ity of the death penalty, the defendant is permitted to offer any
evidence in mitigation and the sentencer is required to listen. "1
The Court to date has not addressed the issue of how much weight
is to be accorded this evidence. Eddings leaves still unanswered
102. 438 U.S. at 604.
103. Id. at 605. Chief Justice Burger stated: "The nonavailability of corrective or mod-
ifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for
individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sen-
tence." Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 32-34, 92-94 and accompanying text.
107. See 438 U.S. at 604.
108. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 81, at 326.
109. 438 U.S. at 604.
110. See 102 S. Ct. at 875-76.
111. Id. at 874.
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the interesting question of when evidence offered in mitigation be-
comes sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances and the
sentence of death.
The Court in Eddings may have provided some guidance in an-
swering this question when the capital defendant is a juvenile. The
majority opinion placed particular emphasis on the fact that youth
is more than a chronological point in time. " 2 On remand, in addi-
tion to considering Eddings' age, the trier of fact was instructed to
consider all circumstances surrounding Eddings' youth. " The
Court, in effect, may be indicating that circumstances surrounding
the upbringing of a juvenile defendant such as those present in the
Eddings case are sufficiently mitigating to offset the penalty of
death. Indeed, even Chief Justice Burger in dissent expressed un-
certainty as to whether or not he would have imposed the death
penalty were he the trier of fact.1" '
In light of the facts of Eddings, however, another conclusion
may be reached. The Court had before it a case involving the im-
position of the death penalty on an individual who was sixteen
years old at the time the crime was committed."' In fact, the peti-
tion for certiorari was granted on the sole question of whether the
eighth amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who was
sixteen at the time of the offense."' By deciding the case on the
basis of Lockett, the Court avoided dealing with this issue.1 1 7 On
remand, the possibility exists that the Oklahoma courts, in weigh-
ing the evidence offered in mitigation against the aggravating cir-
cumstances as ordered by the Eddings Court, may still impose the
sentence of death. If this occurs, the Supreme Court may have
before it once again the question of whether the eighth amendment
forbids the execution of an indiviudal who was age sixteen at the
time he committed the offense.
James F. Risoleo
112. Id. at 876.
113. Id. at 877.
114. Id. at 883 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 872-73.
116. Id. at 874.
117. Id. n.5. But see Chief Justice Burger's dissenting admonitions: "It can never be
less than the most painful of our duties to pass on capital cases, and the more so in a case
such as this one. However, there comes a time in every case when a court must bite the
bullet." Id. at 883 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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